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THE BANK -CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
Contractual Stipulations That Vary the Effect of the U.C.C.
The checking account contract between a bank and its customer
obligates the bank to pay sums out of the customer's account only
to the extent that the bank follows the "order" of the customer to
pay, embodied in the checks he issues. Section 4-401 of the Commer-
cial Laws of Louisiana' indicates that a bank may charge against the
customer's account a "properly payable" item,2 and the negative im-
plication is that any order not the act or responsibility of the customer
is not properly payable and therefore may not be charged to the
customer's account. The principle of section 4-401 is traceable to the
ancient case of Hall v. Fuller,3 in which the drawer's order to pay
three pounds was altered so as to read "two hundred pounds" and
paid in the altered amount. The drawee was required to repay the
drawer one hundred and ninety-seven pounds. Because the rule of Hall
v. Fuller and section 4-401 rests upon a contractual basis 4 rather than
a "reasonably prudent banker" basis, the drawee bank today may not
charge the customer's account even on items in which the not prop-
erly payable status is impossible to detect. Unauthorized drawer
signatures, unauthorized holder indorsements, and skillful alterations
are examples of such items.
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 10:4-401 (Supp. 1974).
2. "Item" is defined in LA. R.S. 10:4-104(1)(g) (Supp. 1974) as "any instrument for
the payment of money even though it is not negotiable but does not include money."
Personal checks, bank drafts, cashier's checks, notes, and even nonnegotiable instruments
are "items."
3. 5 B. & C. 750, 108 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1826).
4. In holding that the bank could only charge three pounds against the drawer's
account, the court stated,
The banker, as the depository of the customer's money, is bound to pay from
time to time such sums as the latter may order. If, unfortunately, he pays money
belonging to the customer upon an order which is not genuine, he must suffer,
and to justify the payment, he must show that the order is genuine, not in signature
only, but in every respect. This was not a genuine order, for the customer never
ordered the payment of the money mentioned in the check.
5 B. & C. at 757, 108 Eng. Rep. at 282.
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The apparently unforgiving nature of the rule of Hall v. Fuller
is tempered somewhat by sections 1-102(3) and 4-103(1) of the Com-
mercial Laws,5 by which the effect of the Commercial Laws may be
varied by agreement.' The freedom of contract inherent in sections
1-102(3) and 4-103(1) is limited only by the following exceptions: (1)
no variation is permitted whenever the Commercial Laws otherwise
provide;7 (2) the obligations prescribed by the Commercial Laws per-
taining to good faith,8 diligence,9 reasonableness," and care" may not
be disclaimed; (3) no agreement can disclaim a bank's general respon-
sibility for its lack of good faith"3 or failure to exercise ordinary care; 4
and (4) no agreement can limit the measure of damages for any such
lack or failure. 5 Within such limits, and of course within the limits
of the Civil Code applicable to all contracts,"6 the bank and its
customers may determine by agreement the standards by which good
5. LA. R.S. 10:1-102(3) (Supp. 1974) provides:
The effect of provisions of this Title may be varied by agreement, except as other-
wise provided in this Title and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by this Title may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
La. R.S. 10:4-103(1) (Supp. 1974) provides:
The effect of the provisions of this Chapter may be varied by agreement except
that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good
faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit the measure of damages
for such lack or failure; but the parties may by agreement determine the stan-
dards by which such responsibility is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
6. See generally Hersbergen, The Bank-Customer Relationship Under the Loui-
siana Commercial Laws, 36 LA. L. REv. 29 (1975).
7. LA. R.S. 10:1-102(3) (Supp. 1974). Given the adoption in Louisiana of only articles
1, 3, 4 and 5 of the U.C.C., the exception in question is of little present relevance,
since the only examples of an "otherwise provided" exception occur in LA. R.S.
10:4-103(1) (Supp. 1974) itself, and impliedly in LA. R.S. 10:1-203 (Supp. 1974). The ex-
ception, however, has greater relevance to provisions of the U.C.C. not adopted in
Louisiana, such as U.C.C. SS 2-719, 9-501(3). U.C.C. S 1-102, comment 3 does point out
that as a matter of drafting style, the absence of words such as "unless they other-
wise agreed," occurring, for example, in LA. R.S. 10:3-201(3) (Supp. 1974) and LA. R.S.
10:3-414(2) (Supp. 1974) has no negative implication vis-a-vis S 1-102(3).
8. See LA. R.S. 10:1-203, 1-208, 4-108(1), 4-401(2), 4-404 (Supp. 1974).
9. See LA. R.S. 10:4-202, 4-301(2) (Supp. 1974).
10. See LA. R.S. 10:4-202(2), 4-204(1), 4-403(1), 4-406(1) (Supp. 1974).
11. See LA. R.S. 10:4-103(5), 4-202(1), 4-406(3) (Supp. 1974).
12. LA. R.S. 10:1-102(3) (Supp. 1974).
13. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901; LA. R.S. 10:1-203, 1-208, 4-103(1), 4-108(1), 4-401(2),
4-404 (Supp. 1974).
14. LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1). See statutes cited in notes 10 & 11, supra.
15. LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1) (Supp. 1974).
16. U.C.C. S 1-103 states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative
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faith and the exercise of ordinary care are to be measured, provided
that the standards are not "manifestly unreasonable."' 7
An obvious candidate for an agreement in variance of section 4-401
is the facsimile signature produced by machine or handstamp. The
facsimile signature is a convenience for the corporate officer or
employee to whose lot falls the signing of numerous checks, but it
does add to the bank's "properly payable" items headache."s In the
hands of the authorized but faithless officer or employee, or of the
unauthorized person, the facsimile signature can create bogus checks
that are identical to authorized and properly payable ones. 9 Sections
3-405, 3-406, and 4-406 do provide protection for the bank in such situa-
tions, but a carefully drafted facsimile signature agreement may be
the more prudent approach. Such an agreement was upheld in Perini
Corp. v. First National Bank of Habersham County," but a similar
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supple-
ment its provisions." The Commercial Laws deleted this section due to its reference
to "concepts and terms either unknown to Louisiana or having different meaning."
LA. R.S. 10:1-103, La. St. L. Inst. Comment. LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974) states instead:
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this, Title, the other laws of Loui-
siana shall apply."
The Commercial Laws do not adopt the U.C.C. definition of "agreement," but U.C.C.
5 1-205 was adopted. Obviously an "agreement" within the meaning of LA. R.S. 10:4-103
must, under LA. R.S. 10:1-103, be a valid and enforceable agreement under Louisiana
law, though a course of dealing between the parties or a usage of trade may "give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify" the terms of an agreement between
them. LA. R.S. 10:1-205. Comment 2 to S 4-103 reveals that within the intent of the drafters
of the U.C.C., the agreement "may be direct, as between the customer and the
depositary bank," or "indirect, as where the customer authorizes a particular type
of procedure and any bank in the collection chain acts pursuant to such authoriza-
tion," it "may be with respect to a single item," or "to all items handled for a par-
ticular customer," as for example, a "general agreement between the depositary bank
and the customer at the time a deposit account is opened." Legends on deposit tickets,
collection letters, and acknowledgments of items, "coupled with action by the affected
party constituting acceptance, adoption, ratification, estoppel or the like, are
'agreements,'" in the U.C.C. sense of S 4-103, if they meet the tests of the definition
of 'agreement.' "
17. LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1) (Supp. 1974).
18. To be within S 4-401, a check would not have to be negotiable, S 4-104(1)(g),
but whether or not negotiable, it would have to be signed. Under S 1-201, "signed"
includes "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authen-
ticate a writing."
19. Although the end product is identical, the facsimile signature will have been
produced by either an authorized act or an unauthorized act; the latter situation falls
within the S 3-404(1) provision that "any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative
as that of the person whose name is signed . Naturally, a signature may be
made by an authorized agent. S 3-403. These provisions of chapter 3 of the Commer-
cial Laws apply to chapter 4 bank-customer situations via S 4-102(1).
20. 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977).
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agreement did not stand up in Cumis Insurance Society v. Girard
Bank."
The Perini Corporation had adopted (presumably at the insistence
of the drawee banks) a corporate resolution authorizing four banks
to honor and charge Perini's account on all checks drawn in the name
of the company:
when bearing or purporting to bear the single facsimile signature
of R. A. Munroe. . . .regardless of by whom or by what means
the actual or purported facsimile signature thereon may have been
affixed thereto, if such facsimile signature resembled the facsimile
specimen from time to time filed with said banks ...."
An unknown party obtained preprinted Perini checks and either gained
access to Perini's facsimile signature machine or perhaps perfected
a likeness of the signature produced by the machine. Ultimately,
drawee banks paid out of Perini's accounts over $1 million on seven-
teen checks bearing unauthorized facsimile signatures of R. A. Munroe.
The Fifth Circuit ruled that Perini Corporation had no recourse against
the drawee on the unauthorized signatures, in light of the facsimile
signature resolution.
In Cumis, the bank required a corporate resolution from the
drawer similar to that in Perini, by which Cumis Insurance Society's
insured authorized Girard Bank to honor checks "bearing or purport-
ing to bear the facsimile signature or any signature or signatures
resembling the facsimile specimens . ..with the same effect as if
the signature or signatures were manual signatures. .".."'I The Penn-
sylvania federal court decision provides a lesson for lawyers: the "with
the same effect as if ... manual signatures" language created an am-
biguity not present in the Perini resolution, and it was construed
favorably to the drawer, thus undermining the agreement. On the one
hand, the "bearing or purporting to bear" language seemed to sug-
gest, as in Perini, that the drawee was authorized to honor items
produced either by the unauthorized use of the drawer's actual fac-
simile signature stamp or by a bogus facsimile signature stamp. The
intent of the parties in this regard was made uncertain by the "manual
signatures" language that followed, for if the facsimile signature was
simply to be treated as a manual signature, the legal consequences
attendant thereto would require that the drawee bear the loss caused
by bogus facsimile signatures, because of section 3-404(1). Alter-
natively, the intent may have been to protect the bank from liability
where the facsimile signature was produced by the real stamp or
21. 522 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
22. 553 F.2d at 400.
23. 522 F. Supp. at 416.
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machine but not where a bogus stamp or machine produced the fac-
simile signature. That construction, the more favorable of the two from
the drawer's point of view, was adopted by the court, with the result
that the drawee remained liable for the wrongful payment of items
bearing unauthorized drawer signatures which, while "strikingly
similar" to authentic facsimile signatures, were not shown to have
been produced by the authentic facsimile stamp.
It seems clear from Perini and Cumis that banks can validly pro-
tect themselves from unauthorized checks produced by the authentic
facsimile signature stamp or machine. The ability of a bank to gain
broader protection by bringing into the agreement the nonauthentic
facsimile signature item is not so clear. The Cumis court seemed to
take the view that such an agreement, free of ambiguity, could be
enforceable, but the court did not reach the issue. The Fifth Circuit's
Perini decision likewise did not reach that issue. But having denied
the drawee's protection in that regard due to the ambiguous nature
of the contractual language, the Cumis court went on record as doubt-
ing that an agreement could validly authorize payment on any fac-
simile signature regardless of origin.24
Sections 4-103(1) and 1-102(3) do not sanction agreements that
disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure
to exercise ordinary care, and an agreement which permits the honor-
ing of items bearing any signature that "purports" to be or
"resembles" the genuine facsimile signature may be viewed as an im-
permissible attempt by the bank to exculpate itself from the conse-
24. Id. at 417. In Mercantile Stores Co. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 641 P.2d 1007
(Idaho App. 1982), a former employee of the drawer obtained a quantity of unnumbered
blank checks on which he traced a likeness of the drawer's facsimile signature by
using carbon paper and the authentic facsimile signature from a dividend check he
had received from the drawer. Ultimately the drawee honored fourteen of the bogus
checks, and refused to recredit the drawer's account therefor, on the basis of an agree-
ment by which the bank
shall be entitled to honor and charge the drawer's account for any such checks...
regardless of by whom or by what manner the facsimile signature thereon may have
been affixed thereto if such facsimile signature resembles the facsimile specimen im-
pressed on this resolution and the corporation signature card furnished the depository
bank.
The drawer was not found to have been negligent either as a matter of S 3-406 or
S 4-406. The court held that the facsimile signature agreement did not apply to the
checks in litigation since the act of tracing the signature on the checks did not con-
stitute the placement thereon of a "facsimile signature." The fact that the traced
signature in fact "resembled" the facsimile specimen produced by the company's
signature machine did not help the bank's case, for, while the agreements did create
a standard of performance for the bank under some circumstances, it would be mani-




quences of its own negligence. Although it is difficult to see how a
drawee could be negligent in paying checks bearing authentic but
unauthorized signatures, or bearing nonauthentic signatures "strik-
ingly similar" to the authentic facsimile signatures, the Cumis court
makes a valid point. For example, suppose the rascal in Cumis had
presented one of the bogus checks directly to the drawee, and in the
style of the rascal in Perini, he had an obviously fake mustache at-
tached to his upper lip by visible tape.25 Despite such suspicious cir-
cumstances, the Cumis and Perini agreements would theoretically pro-
tect the bank if the check was paid. The Cumis court is not ready
to sanction such a broadly written agreement.
There is another potential pitfall for the Cumis and Perini
agreements: sections 1-102(3) and 4-103(1) permit agreements that vary
the effect of the provisions of the Commercial Laws; however, the
bank may not simply rewrite the legislative will. In context, the
statutory norm of the Commercial Laws dictates that the risks of
unauthorized drawer signatures are on the drawee, but the risks are
balanced by the protection of sections 3-405, 3-406, 4-406, and the im-
plied warranties of section 4-207(1). Banks cannot simply shift these
risks to the customer in an adhesion contract. To the Cumis court,
such a shifting of risks was precisely what the agreement sought to
do. The effect of provisions of the law, however, can be varied by an
agreement that defines standards. For instance, section 4-406 requires
the customer to exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine
his returned items and statement-of account to discover alterations
and forgeries of his name, but the standard of care and promptness
is not prescribed. Accordingly, the bank, by agreement, may require
that the customer notify the bank of any such forgeries or altera-
tions within a certain period-six months, for example-and thereafter
the statement of account shall be deemed accurate." From this point
of view, the lawyer should not place undue faith in the Perini deci-
sion because the agreement in question, by equating the mere use
of facsimile signatures with all risks incident thereto, may be invalid.
ITEMS IN THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS
The Payor Bank's Warranty Protection
A justification of the Cumis view of bank-customer agreements
in variance with the U.C.C. is the broad protection of payor banks
25. 553 F.2d at 402.
26. See New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 41 A.D.2d 912, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1973). Giving the customer a
very short period in which to meet his S 4406 obligations may be viewed not as an
attempt to define the standard of care but as an impermissible attempt to shift the
[Vol. 43
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1981-1982
therein. When a payor bank has paid an item that is not properly
chargeable to the customer's account, the U.C.C. (and the Commer-
cial Laws as a faithful adoption of it) affords the bank three defensive
postures. First, the three most common examples of improperly
payable items -unauthorized drawer signatures, unauthorized in-
dorsements, and material alterations-are subject to the prescriptive,
or limitation of action, period in section 4-406(4).2 Second, the customer
can be precluded under section 4-406 from asserting his unauthorized
signature or an alteration if he fails to exercise reasonable care and
promptness in examining the periodic statement of account and return-
ed items and in discovering and notifying the bank of such unauthoriz-
ed signatures or' alterations.28 Third, the payor bank may seek the
protection of sections 3-405, 3-406, or 3-407; the first section cures what
otherwise would be an unauthorized indorsement on "fictitious payee"
and "impostor" checks,' while the latter sections preclude the asser-
tion of unauthorized signatures and material alterations by the drawer
or any person "who by his negligence substantially contributes" to
the alteration or to the making of the unauthorized signature.
Whenever the payor bank successfully assumes one of the three
defensive postures, the drawer's demand for a recrediting of his
account for the improperly payable item is avoided and the loss is
entire risk to the customer, while in effect exculpating the bank from the consequences
of its 'own negligence. See State ex rel. Gabalac v. Firestone Bank, 46 Ohio App. 2d
124, 346 N.E.2d 326 (1975).
27. Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank
a customer who does not within one year from the time the statement and items
are made available to the customer discover and report his unauthorized signature
or any alteration on the face or back of the item or does not within three years
from that time discover and report any unauthorized indorsement is precluded
from asserting against the bank such unauthorized signature or indorsement or
such alteration.
LA. R.S. 10:4-406(4) (Supp. 1974).
28. See S 4-406(1), (2). The customer is not required by S 4-406 to exercise reasonable
care to discover unauthorized indorsements. See Hersbergen, Developments in the Law,
1979-1980-Banking Law, 41 LA. L. REV. 313, 332-34 (1981).
29. (1) An indorsement by any person in'the name of a named payee is effective if
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the maker
or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name
of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with
the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
Nothing in this Section shall affect the criminal or civil liability
of the person so indorsing.
LA::R.S. 10:3-405 (Supp. 1974).
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shifted to the drawer-where it may very well come to rest.' However,
an alternative to these defensive postures is provided by the Com-
mercial Laws. Under section 4-207, the payor bank that pays an item
is protected by the implied warranties of the collecting bank that it
has good title to the item, that it has no knowledge that the drawer's
signature is unauthorized, and that the item has not been materially
altered. As a reflection of the ancient rule of Price v. Neal" that the
drawee is in the better position to know when the signature of the
drawer is unauthorized, the warranty of "no knowledge" on the part
of a collecting bank is virtually meaningless. The warranties with
respect to title and alterations, by contrast, are potent protections
for the drawee-payor bank. Still, there are some pitfalls to be avoid-
ed by a payor bank: section 4-207(1) protects only a "good faith"'" payor
who claims his warranty protection within a reasonable time after
he learns of the breach33 and who is willing to assert his defensive
postures against the drawer-customer.' The question of what con-
stitutues a "reasonable time" within which to claim a section 4-207
warranty involves the same basic considerations that determine the
reasonableness of the time of presentment of demand instruments.
Thus, quite lengthy delays in claiming the warranty protection will
not necessarily defeat the payor's claim, and certainly that is so if
30. The drawer has been permitted to sue a collecting bank for negligence and
for breach of warranty, but the collecting bank should in such an action be permitted
to assume the same basic defensive postures afforded the drawee. See Perini Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977); Sun 'N Sand,
Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920 (1978). Louisiana courts
have not as yet ruled on the viability of the drawer's warranty actions. In Koerner
& Lambert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (permitting
a negligence action against the drawer), the drawer alleged in defense of a claim against
it that the claimant had breached the warranty of good title under LA. R.S. 10:3-417(1),
but the drawer's own negligence precluded it under LA. R.S. 10:3-406 from raising the
unauthorized payee signature essential to the warranty of title allegation. The case
is discussed in Hersbergen, supra note 28, at 334-38. Under Sun 'N Sand, the court
would be required to hold that the drawer is either an "other payor who ... pays
... the item" under S 4-207(1) or "a person who ... pays" under S 3-417(1). Because
LA. R.S. 10:4-202(1) requires that a collecting bank use ordinary care in handling an item,
a negligence action by the drawer seems a distinct possibility; Louisiana courts have
not as yet faced this issue.
31. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
32. The meaning of good faith under S 4-207(1) has not been tested in the courts,
but presumably the definition under LA. R.S. 10:1-201 of "honesty in fact in the con-
duct or transaction" would translate in the 5 4-207(1) context as "no actual knowledge"
of an unauthorized signature or material alteration. Cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Traders
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 514 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. App. 1974) (issue pretermitted by a stipula-
tion between the payor and the collecting bank).
33. LA. R.S. 10:4-207(4) (Supp. 1974).
34. LA. R.S. 10:4-406(5) (Supp. 1974).
35. LA. R.S. 10:3-503(2) (Supp. 1974).
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no damage has resulted from the delay. An example of unreasonable
delay under section 4-207(4) is found in Home Indemnity Co. v. First
National Bank.6 Home Indemnity, an insurance company, issued its
claim payment drafts "payable through" 7 Hartford National Bank. One
such draft was issued on July 19, 1977, in the amount of $18,000,
payable jointly 8 to Mary Taylor and Howard Lidov, her lawyer. On
July 23, 1977, one Will Loyd deposited the draft for collection in his
account at First National Bank, having apparently forged the
signatures of both Taylor and Lidov. First National accepted the draft
for deposit on the condition that no withdrawals be made therefrom
for two weeks. On July 26, Hartford National Bank received the draft
from First National and forwarded it to Home Indemnity. On the same
day, Lidov advised Home Indemnity of nonreceipt and the decision
was made to issue a "stop payment order."39
On August 2, the stop order was issued by Home Indemnity's
Chicago claims office, but, inexplicably, it was not received by the
principal office in New York until August 8. On August 11, the New
York office determined that payment could be stopped; this was a
mistake, as the draft had been paid on or shortly after July 26. Taylor
had informed Home Indemnity on August 29 that her signature was
forged, and Home Indemnity contacted First National about the
forgery on September 9. On September 26, Home Indemnity obtain-
ed from Taylor an affidavit of forgery and formally presented it to
First National. Loyd had withdrawn the entire $18,000 on August 8
and 9.
Through the series of delays that began on July 26, First Na-
tional was kept in the dark for six weeks. "In the light of modern
methods of communication with the availability of immediate electronic
and telephonic transmission of information," said the Seventh Circuit,
"the district court was warranted in finding the delay unreasonable
as a matter of law.""0
Although some decisions have implied that a payor has no duty
to inform the warrantor of a probable forgery until an affidavit of
forgery is obtained," the Seventh Circuit rejected that notion as un-
36. 659 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1981).
37. See LA. R.S. 10:3-120 (Supp. 1974).
38. See LA. R.S. 10:3-116 (Supp. 1974).
39. Technically, Home Indemnity could not issue a stop order on a "payable
through" draft since Hartford National Bank, under § 3-120, could not have paid it
without consultation with Home Indemnity; stated otherwise, the payable through draft
was not an "item payable for" Home Indemnity's account under S 4-403. In the
nontechnical sense, the message to Hartford would no doubt have been clear and obeyed.
40. 659 F.2d at 799 (emphasis added).
41. See Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83,. 99 (Mo. App. 1976).
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founded in the U.C.C. and likely to defeat the purpose of section 4-207
to encourage prompt notification of forgeries. According to the Seventh
Circuit, a payor's notification duty can be based on an agent's
knowledge that the instrument has been paid, although not ever re-
ceived by the payee. Whether or not Home Indemnity's duty was
violated as early as July 26, when it first obtained knowledge of the
fraud, to the Seventh Circuit, the duty certainly was violated when
Home Indemnity failed to notify First National by August 8.
In Clarkson v. Selected Risks Insurance Co.,4" the payor learned
of a probable forged payee signature on December 21, 1977, and im-
mediately notified the drawer, Selected Risks, but did not notify the
collecting bank until February 24, 1978. Requesting verification prior
to taking action was not unreasonable, said the court, but delaying
that request for more than a month was unreasonable. However, the
account in question at the collecting bank had contained only insignifi-
cant funds after September of 1977, and in any event the rascal was
a lawyer, hence the account funds were held by him in trust and thus
beyond the collecting bank's right of set-off. That being so, the delay
caused no loss to the collecting bank.
A delay of seventy-seven days in notifying the collecting bank
of a material alteration was held to be unreasonable in First National
Bank of St. Paul v. Trust Co. of Cobb County, 3 but thl court conclud-
ed that the delay had no effect on the collecting bank, as a notifica-
tion within ten days (which the court said would have been "well
within the boundaries of reasonable notice") would have found the
accounts in question with only negligible funds.
The defensive postures of sections 3-406, 3-407, and 4-406 are not
necessarily seen by payor banks as alternatives to the section 4-207
warranty action against the collecting bank. When it is the "good"
customer who would absorb a loss caused by rascality, the payor bank
would no doubt agonize a bit before asserting sections 3-405, 3-407,
and 4-406." In recognition of this fact of commercial life, section 4-406(5)
declares that "[i]f under this section a payor bank has a valid defense
against a claim of a customer upon or resulting from payment of an
item" and waives that claim or fails upon request (of the collecting
42. 170 N.J. Super. 373, 406 A.2d 494 (Law Div. 1979).
43. 510 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
44. A payor bank is more likely to assert S 3-405 against the good customer because
if it does not, the collecting bank can avoid the warranty of title breach by asserting
that section itself. See Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977); Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225
(D.N.J. 1979). The facsimile signature agreement and similar exculpatory agreements
are asserted for the same reason: there is no meaningful warranty from the collecting
banks beyond those of good title and material alterations.
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bank, presumably) to assert the defense, the payor bank may not
assert against any collecting bank or other prior party a claim based
upon the unauthorized signature or alteration which gives rise to the
customer's claim. Obviously affected by section 4-406(5) is the section
4-207(1) warranty claim, but presumably the payor bank's section 4-407
subrogation rights'5 'are also affected.
In view of the similarity of the underlying facts, it is not totally
clear why the section 4-406 defensive posture may not be waived by
the payor bank, while the sections 3-406 and 3-407 defensive postures
apparently may be waived, without prejudice to the payor bank's war-
ranty claim. Comment 7 to section 4-406 admits that, "[a]lthough the
principle of subsection (5) might well be applied to other types of
claims of customers against banks and defenses to these claims," the
rule itself is limited to defenses of a payor bank under this section
and "no present need is known to give the rule wider effect."
Just as it is surely tempting for a payor to waive defenses against
the good customer and assert instead a warranty claim against the
collecting bank, it occasionally has tempted a court to let section
4-406(5)'s principle apply to defenses the payor bank may have against
the drawer that do not arise "under this section." Most courts have
not succumbed to this temptation," including the federal district court
in the 1979 case of Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank." In
45. If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer
or maker or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the
drawer or maker, to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary
to prevent loss to the bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank
shall be subrogated to the rights
(a) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or maker;
and
(b) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer or
maker either on the item or under the transaction out of which the item
arose; and
(c) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of the
item with respect to the transaction out of which the item arose.
LA. R.S. 10:4-407 (Supp. 1974).
46. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Merchants Bank of New York, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), Clarkson v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 170
N.J. Super. 373, 406 A.2d 494 (Law Div. 1979), and East Gadsden Bank v. First City
Nat'l Bank of Gadsden, 50 Ala. App. 576, 281 So. 2d 431 (Civ. App. 1973), view subsec-
tion 4-406(5) as limited to the defenses arising under that section. Taking a contrary
view is Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
64 Misc. 2d 959, 316 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Other courts have implied that S
3-406 and 3-407 should be incorporated into S 4-406(5). See Stone & Webster Eng'r
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962); Society
Nat'l Bank v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 2d 1, 281 N.E.2d 563 (1972). See also
Whaley, Negligence and Negotiable Instruments, 53 N.C.L. REV. 1, 21 (1974).
47. 474 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.J. 1979).
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deference to comment 7 to section 4-406,"8 Girard seems a correct deci-
sion; yet, a caveat must be mentioned: one may doubt that a payor
bank waiving what it knew to be, or objectively seemed to be, a "valid
defense" could be in good faith.'9 Moreover, subsection 4-406(5) and
comment 7 thereto could be viewed as evidencing a legislative intent
to merely insure that the section 4-406 defenses cannot be waived
without prejudice to warranty claims, rather than an intent that a
section 3-406 defense can be waived. In short, nothing in section 4-207
suggests, in the style of section 4-406(5), that the payor can waive
the section 3-406 or section 3-407 defense without prejudice to its war-
ranty claim. Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:1-103 & 10:1-106,"0
a Louisiana court might be willing to fill the gap."
48. Important to the decisions in Mellon and Girard was the history of U.C.C.
sections 4-406 and 4-207. In an early draft of the U.C.C., a provision similar 'to that
now comprising subsection 4-406(5) was included in S 4-207, so that the warranty ac-
tion could not have been maintained if the payor waived defenses it had against the
drawer based on delay in reporting unauthorized signatures and alterations (S 4-406)
and negligence in preparing and issuing checks (§§ 3-406, 3-407). As adopted, however,
the official draft of the U.C.C. moved that provision from S 4-207 to its final resting
place in S 4-406(5) and the phrase was added limiting it to S 4-406. See Girard, 474
F. Supp. at 1237.
49. Section 4-207(1) only requires that the payor bank pay in "good faith," but
LA. R.S. 10:1-203 imposes a broad duty of good faith in enforcing contracts or duties. Cf.
Seinfeld v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 405 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. App. 1981) (good faith
in a commercial setting); C-K Enter., Inc. v. Depositors Trust Co., 438 A.2d 262 (Me.
1981) (bank cannot arbitrarily close an account).
50. Under S 1-106, the remedies provided by title 10 "shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed." In the S 4-406(5) situation, the aggrieved party is the payor
bank and the remedy is S 4-207(1). While the Girard approach to S 4-406(5) complies
with the "letter" of S 1-106, it arguably offends the spirit of that section by allowing
the drawer, the party at fault, to avoid a loss that he could have prevented but that
the collecting bank could not have prevented. Of course, to the extent the collecting
bank is at fault, S 3-406 will not aid it anyway, since the section itself requires a col-
lecting bank seeking its protection to have observed reasonable commercial standards.
51. It can be argued that, while the relationship between the S 4-406 defenses
and the S 4-207(1) warranties is a matter "displaced by the particular provisions of
this Title" under S 1-103, so that the "other laws of Louisiana" do not apply, the same
is not true of the relationship between the 5 3-406 and S 3-407 defenses and the payor's
warranty protection, thus permitting the other laws of Louisiana to apply. The case
of Koerner & Lambert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979),
for example, permitted a party in the position of a collecting bank to sue a drawer
on the theory that the check had been issued negligently, causing the plaintiff loss (the
debiting of plaintiff's account by the depositary bank, presumably by virtue of war-
ranties made by plaintiff as a customer-depositor). The court did not characterize the
action as a S 1-103 matter and erroneously referred to S 3-406.
Another feature of Louisiana law that might bear on a Girard case is unjust enrich-
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THE REGULATION OF "BANKING ACTIVITIES"
Banking is a business of delineated powers. Title 6 of the Loui-
siana Revised Statutes, section 237, declares that "banking associa-
tions have the following powers, those incidental to the exercise of
these powers, and no others." There then follows a listing of banking
powers such as receipt of deposits, the making of loans, the accept-
ing of drafts drawn by customers, and the discounting of commercial
paper. Chapters 3 and 4 of title 10 (the Louisiana U.C.C.) and chapter
2 of title 9 (the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law) of the Revised
Statutes add certain rights and responsibilities to those delineated
powers without actually adding any new powers. Banking activities
within the meaning of section 237 are subject to the supervision and
regulation of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions." The Com-
missioner's bailiwick is significant for at least this issue: the provi-
sions of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protec-
tion Law' do not apply to "actions or transactions subject to the
jurisdiction [of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions]." This ex-
emption presumably means that allegations of unfair practices cannot
be made under the trade practices act when the action or transaction
in question comes within section 237 of title 6, or when the action
or transaction comes within the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law,'
over which the commissioner also has jurisdiction.5
The relationship between the commissioner's jurisdiction and the
Unfair Trade Practices Act was before the fourth circuit in Bank of
New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Phillips.' The bank arguably utilized the
unfair practice of intentionally filing suits, to collect amounts owing
by its VISA credit card holders, in the wrong (and presumably in-
convenient) venue. The Phillips decision ruled that the unfair prac-
tices action could be maintained by the cardholder, since bank credit
card transactions are not within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner
of Financial Institutions because: 1) the repeal of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 6:965-969 by Act 466 of 1974 removed bank credit card trans-
actions from the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Financial Institu-
tions, and 2) in any event, in conducting credit card transactions a
ment, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1965, for clearly the drawer is enriched at the expense of the
collecting bank in a Girard situation. The scope of article 1965 is discussed in Ed-
monston v. A-Second Mortgage Co. of Slidell, 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
52. See LA. R.S. 6:1 (Supp. 1972), 6:151 (Supp. 1976), & 6:168 (Supp. 1977).
53. LA. R.S. 51:1401-1418 (Supp. 1972).
54. LA. R.S. 9:3510-3571 (Supp. 1972).
55. LA. R.S. 9:3554-3555 (Supp. 1972).
56. 415 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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bank is not acting as a bank but rather as a commer'cial credit card
company.57 The fourth circuit is wrong on both counts. In the first
place, the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:965-969 were
added to title 6 by section 15 of Act 454 of 1972 (the Consumer Credit
Law), as parallel provisions to certain provisions of title 9
simultaneously enacted and designated as Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:3532, 9:3533, & 9:3534. By these parallel provisions, certain limits
were placed on negotiability, negotiation, and holder in due course
status regarding retail installment contracts, notes, instruments or
other evidences of indebtedness executed by a consumer. Neither sec-
tions 3532-3534 of title 9, nor sections 965-969 of title 6 concerned
bank credit card transactions. When Act 466 of 1974 repealed sec-
tions 965-969 of title 6, the legislature thus said nothing helpful to
the court's opinion in Phillips.
As a matter of fact, the true legislative history of bank credit
cards unquestionably places such transactions within the jurisdiction
of the commissioner. By Act 24 of the 1968 extra session, the
legislature added to title 6 certain provisions regulating bank credit
card transactions and providing for interest and other allowable
charges. 8 These provisions were also repealed as part of the enact-
ment of the Consumer Credit Law, under Act 454 of 1972." But, far
from removing bank credit card transactions from the commissioner's
jurisdiction, Act 454 places such transactions within the commissioner's
jurisdiction, to the extent that the card transaction is a "consumer
credit transaction. '0
The court also seems to believe that credit card transactions are
not within the realm of "banking." A credit card transaction, however,
is simply a preconceived tripartite method of financing purchases
which contemplates the making of loans on an open-end or revolving
57. In the words of the court:
While banks are generally regulated by the State Banking Commissioner, this
particular transaction is not. In the instant case, BNO is not acting as a bank,
but rather as a commercial credit card company. This fact was recognized by
the legislature in 1974. Prior to that time, R.S. 6:965-969, dealing with revolving
loan plans and retail installment contracts, were placed in Chapter 6 of the Revised
Statutes and placed under the jurisdiction of the State Banking Commissioner.
Those provisions were repealed by Acts 1974, No. 466 S 3. Thus, bank credit
card transactions are no longer within the jurisdiction of the State Banking Com-
missioner. Accordingly, the exception contained in R.S. 51:1406 does not apply
and the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act does apply.
415 So. 2d at 975.
58. Act 24 was designated as LA. R.S. 6:1081-1084 & 6:1101-1102.
59. 1972 La. Acts, No. 454, S 4.
60. See LA. R.S. 9:3516(7), (11), (13), (18.), 9:3524, 9:3554, 9:3555 (Supp. 1972).
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basis. The making of loans fits rather nicely into Louisiana Revised
Statutes 6:237.
Does the flawed nature of the Phillips opinion undermine the
result reached by the court? It does not. The exemption of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 51:1406 does not give a bank carte blanche to com-
mit unfair trade practices. A bank cannot employ "bait and switch"
schemes or other unfair or deceptive advertising methods and then
hide behind section 1406; neither can it utilize unfair collection tech-
niques with impunity. When a bank employs such unfair trade prac-
tices it is an advertiser and creditor which happens incidentally to
be a bank." All that is meant by section 1406 is that an unfair trade
practices action cannot be premised upon a bank's consumer loan charges
or its methods of computing those charges or rebates of those charges,
for such matters are within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Financial Institutions, in his role as administrator of the Consumer
Credit Law. The same may be said of the bank's contacts to various
persons in its collection efforts; section 3562 regulates such contacts,
and therefore such may not form the premise of an unfair trade prac-
tices suit.
The relationship between the banking powers as outlined in title
6, section 237, and the powers of a creditor under the Louisiana Con-
sumer Credit Law was a determining factor in Bank of Winnfield &
Trust Co. v., United States."' The Bank of Winnfield had, during the
1973 and 1974 tax years, made credit life insurance available to its
customers through an affiliated corporation,2 and had not treated as
its own the income derived therefrom. 4 Federal law prohibits a
national bank from selling insurance and that fact had influenced the
1972 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Commissioner
v. First Security Bank of Utah"' (a case involving facts virtually iden-
61. In Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1975), the federal
court ruled on an alleged violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Act by a bank, giving no indication of the possible relevancy of LA.
R.S. 51:1406.
62. 540 F. Supp. 219 (W.D. La. 1982).
63. Premiums paid by those customers choosing to purchase credit life insurance
would be deposited by bank officials into a checking account maintained at the bank
by Black Cat Corporation, the four sole-shareholders of which were also the control-
ling shareholders of the bank.
64. Black Cat Corporation would transfer 40/o of the premium deposited to the
insurer, paying the remainder to the four shareholders of Black Cat, who reported
the premium income on their individual tax returns (Black Cat having elected Sub-
chapter S status under the Internal Revenue Code).
65. 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
19821
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tical to those in Bank of Winnfield) that such income was not proper-
ly to be allocated to the bank. If Louisiana law similarly prohibited
a state bank from engaging in the sale of insurance or the receipt
of insurance commissions, the bank could expect a result similar to
that of the First Security Bank case. The sale of insurance (or the
receipt of commissions therefrom) is not among the banking powers
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:237, but the Louisiana Consumer
Credit Law permits an extender of credit" under that law to sell credit
insurance. 7 The federal court, however, was not willing to let that
legislation add sub silentio to the expressly limited powers of Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 6:237.8
Banks and other extenders of credit making loans which do not meet
the definition of a "consumer loan" under the Louisiana Consumer
Credit Law," or which are excluded from the application of that law, °
are permitted to stipulate that the transaction is subject to the pro-
visions of the Consumer Credit Law." One reason to so stipulate is
to gain a higher permissible rate of charge for certain categories of
loans. The finance company lender in Caffey v. People Mortgage & Loan
of Shreveport, Inc.7" had not so stipulated-at least in specific and
express language-but had contracted for an interest rate which,
while higher than that permitted by Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:3503, 3 was apparently within the permissible bounds of the Con-
sumer Credit Law. The lender unsuccessfully argued that the stipula-
tion necessary to bring the credit law to bear on loans not within
the credit law need not be expressly written into the transaction, but
could in effect form a part of the contract based on the borrower's
knowledge that the lender was a finance company governed by the
credit law and the expectation the borrower therefore must have had
that he would be charged rates permitted by the credit law. Such
a ruling, of course, would blow a large-size hole in usury laws such
66. LA. R.S. 9:3516(16) (Supp. 1972).
67. LA. R.S. 9:3542-3550 (Supp. 1972 & 1980). Subsection 3550(c) does require that
an insurance premium financer obtain a license from the commissioner.
68. The opinion observes that in the First Security Bank case, the United States
Supreme Court had distinguished between "selling" insurance and "making available"
insurance. 540 F. Supp. at 221 n.6. See also First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 402 n.16.
69. LA. R.S. 9:3516(11), (13).
70. LA. R.S. 9:3512.
71. LA. R.S. 9:3514.
72. 408 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
73. Before Act 205 of 1979, LA. R.S. 9:3503 stated that "the amount of simple con-
ventional interest on obligations bearing interest from date and secured . . . by a
mortgage on immovable property shall not exceed ten per cent per annum."
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as Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3501," and that fact was well
understood by the second circuit. The summary judgment ordering
forfeiture under section 3501 was affirmed."5
74. "Any contract for the payment of interest in excess of that authorized by
law shall result in the forfeiture of the entire interest so contracted." LA. R.S. 9:3501
(1950).
75. See also Bamburg v. Lavigne, 403 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).

